New York Appellate Digest
  • Home
  • About
  • Just Released
  • Update Service
  • Streamlined Research
  • CLE Courses
  • Contact
  • Menu Menu
You are here: Home1 / Criminal Law2 / THE MAJORITY DETERMINED THE DEFENDANT DEVELOPED THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE...
Criminal Law, Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)

THE MAJORITY DETERMINED THE DEFENDANT DEVELOPED THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMPLAINANT FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF VICTIMIZING HER AND THEREFORE 20 POINTS WERE PROPERLY ASSESSED UNDER RISK FACTOR 7; THE COMPREHENSIVE DISSENT ARGUED THERE WAS A PRE-EXISTING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMPLAINANT WHICH RENDERD RISK FACTOR 7 INAPPLICABLE UNDER THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING IN COOK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined, over a comprehensive dissent, that defendant was properly assessed 20 points because his relationship with the 13-year-old victim was deemed to have been established for the primary purpose of victimizing her. The dissent argued there was a pre-existing relationship and, therefore, defendant did not develop the relationship for the purpose of victimization:

… [T]he record indicates that the defendant did not have a long-standing preexisting relationship with the complainant’s parents, and was not involved in the complainant’s life since her infancy. Rather, the defendant had worked with the complainant’s uncle and was invited to the uncle’s house for lunch, where he met the complainant. Thus, this case is readily distinguishable from the circumstances of Cook [29 NY3d at 121]. Contrary to the position of our dissenting colleague, the fact that the defendant’s initial contact with the complainant was unplanned and in person, rather than through the internet, is not determinative with respect to the assessment of points under risk factor 7 based on an offender’s establishment or promotion of a relationship with the victim for the primary purpose of victimization … . The Guidelines, which were created in 1996, do not limit the assessment of points under those circumstances to situations where the offender and the victim initially met online. People v Jony, 2023 NY Slip Op 04674, Second Dept 9-20-23

Practice Point: A long-standing relationship between a defendant and a victim of sexual abuse may demonstrate the relationship was not established for the primary purpose of victimization rendering the assessment of 20 points under risk factor 7 inapplicable. Here the majority concluded there was no such pre-existing relationship, but the dissent made a strong contrary argument.

 

 

September 20, 2023
Tags: Second Department
Share this entry
  • Share on WhatsApp
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-09-20 14:00:282023-09-25 09:12:15THE MAJORITY DETERMINED THE DEFENDANT DEVELOPED THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMPLAINANT FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF VICTIMIZING HER AND THEREFORE 20 POINTS WERE PROPERLY ASSESSED UNDER RISK FACTOR 7; THE COMPREHENSIVE DISSENT ARGUED THERE WAS A PRE-EXISTING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMPLAINANT WHICH RENDERD RISK FACTOR 7 INAPPLICABLE UNDER THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING IN COOK (SECOND DEPT).
You might also like
TERMINATION OF OUT OF WORK SCHOOL DISTRICT EMPLOYEE PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW IS NOT ARBITRABLE, PETITION TO STAY ARBITRATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
SCHOOL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF WATER ON THE FLOOR IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION TIMELY COMMENCED THE ACTION PURSUANT TO THE SIX-MONTH EXTENSION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVIDED BY CPLR 205-A (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE JUDGE’S RESTRICTIONS ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENSE “FALSE CONFESSION” EXPERT, AND THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR A “PROMISE BY POLICE” JURY INSTRUCTION REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).
The Totality of Circumstances Provided the Police Officer with Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity and Thereby Justified Pursuit of the Defendant
THE FORECLOSURE ACTION BROUGHT IN 2011 WAS DISMISSED BECAUSE THE BANK FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT PROVISIONS IN THE MORTGAGE AGREEMENT; THEREFORE THE 2011 ACTION DID NOT ACCELERATE THE DEBT AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FORECLOSURE NEVER STARTED RUNNING (SECOND DEPT).
BANK DID NOT PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1303; BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER ATTEMPTED TO MAKE A LEFT TURN WHEN PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS TOO CLOSE IN THE ON-COMING LANE (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

  • Abuse of Process
  • Account Stated
  • Accountant Malpractice
  • Administrative Law
  • Agency
  • Animal Law
  • Appeals
  • Arbitration
  • Architectural Malpractice
  • Associations
  • Attorneys
  • Banking Law
  • Bankruptcy
  • Battery
  • Chiropractor Malpractice
  • Civil Commitment
  • Civil Conspiracy
  • Civil Forfeiture
  • Civil Procedure
  • Civil Rights Law
  • Condominium Corporations
  • Condominiums
  • Constitutional Law
  • Consumer Law
  • Contempt
  • Contract Law
  • Conversion
  • Cooperatives
  • Copyright
  • Corporation Law
  • Correction Law
  • County Law
  • Court of Claims
  • Criminal Law
  • Debtor-Creditor
  • Defamation
  • Dental Malpractice
  • Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)
  • Education-School Law
  • Election Law
  • Eminent Domain
  • Employment Law
  • Engineering Malpractice
  • Environmental Law
  • Equitable Recoupment
  • Evidence
  • Fair Credit Reporting Act
  • Fair Housing Act
  • Fair Housing Amendments Act
  • False Arrest
  • False Claims Act
  • False Imprisonment
  • Family Law
  • Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
  • Fiduciary Duty
  • Forcible Touching
  • Foreclosure
  • Fraud
  • Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
  • Human Rights Law
  • Immigration Law
  • Immunity
  • Indian Law
  • Insurance Law
  • Intellectual Property
  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Involuntary Medical Treatment and Feeding (Inmates)
  • Judges
  • Judiciary Law
  • Labor Law
  • Labor Law-Construction Law
  • Land Use
  • Landlord-Tenant
  • Legal Malpractice
  • Lien Law
  • Limited Liability Company Law
  • Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
  • Malicious Prosecution
  • Maritime Law
  • Medicaid
  • Medical Malpractice
  • Mental Hygiene Law
  • Military Law
  • Money Had and Received
  • Municipal Law
  • Navigation Law
  • Negligence
  • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Negligent Misrepresentation
  • Notarial Misconduct
  • Nuisance
  • Partnership Law
  • Personal Property
  • Pharmacist Malpractice
  • Physician Patient Confidentiality
  • Pistol Permits
  • Prima Facie Tort
  • Private Nuisance
  • Privilege
  • Products Liability
  • Professional Malpractice
  • Public Authorities Law
  • Public Corporations
  • Public Health Law
  • Public Nuisance
  • Real Estate
  • Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
  • Real Property Law
  • Real Property Tax Law
  • Religion
  • Replevin
  • Retirement and Social Security Law
  • Securities
  • Sepulcher
  • Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
  • Social Services Law
  • Statutes
  • Tax Law
  • Tenant Harassment
  • Tortious Interference with Contract
  • Tortious Interference with Employment
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations
  • Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
  • Town Law
  • Toxic Torts
  • Trade Secrets
  • Trademarks
  • Trespass
  • Trespass to Chattels
  • Trusts and Estates
  • Uncategorized
  • Unemployment Insurance
  • Unfair Competition
  • Uniform Commercial Code
  • Usury
  • Utilities
  • Vehicle and Traffic Law
  • Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM)
  • Village Law
  • Water Law
  • Workers' Compensation
  • Zoning

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF WAS ELIGIBLE FOR RELEASE FROM JAIL PURSUANT TO CPL 180.80 BUT WAS... THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION AND DID...
Scroll to top