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THE PRE-ANSWER MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION; THE AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANTS DID NOT WARRANT GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS; THE AFFIFAVITS WERE NOT “DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE” AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY MATERIAL FACT ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFFS WAS NOT “A FACT AT ALL” (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants’ pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint, and the motion to treat the dismissal motion as a summary judgment motion should not have been granted. The motion should not have been treated as a summary judgment motion because it was premature. The motion should not have been granted as a dismissal based on documentary evidence because the affidavits submitted by the defendants do not constitute “documentary evidence” within the meaning of the CPLR:

The record demonstrates that the defendants’ pre-answer motion was made less than two months after the action was commenced, and that the plaintiff has had no opportunity to conduct discovery. Further, the defendants seek summary dismissal on the basis of facts asserted in their affidavits about which the plaintiff has no personal knowledge. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff is correct that a summary judgment motion would be premature … . Therefore, the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) should not have been converted into a motion for summary judgment … . * * *

“While a court is permitted to consider evidentiary material submitted by a defendant in support of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), affidavits submitted by a defendant will almost never warrant dismissal under CPLR 3211 unless they establish conclusively that [the plaintiff] has no cause of action” …  by showing that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff “is not a fact at all” and that “no significant dispute exists regarding it” … . * * *

The affidavits submitted by the defendants, which merely contained conclusory denials of the facts asserted by the plaintiff in the complaint, as well as bare factual assertions regarding their use and occupancy of the subject premises, did not demonstrate that “a material fact as claimed by the [plaintiff] to be one is not a fact at all” and that “no significant dispute exists regarding it” … . Russo v Crisona, 2023 NY Slip Op 04438, Second Dept 8-30-23

Practice Point: Although a pre-answer motion to dismiss can be converted to a motion for summary judgment, to do so here was premature. Affidavits generally will not be enough to warrant granting a motion to dismiss. Affidavits are not “documentary evidence.”

 

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