You are here: / / THE COVID STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TOLL FROM MARCH TO NOVEMBER 2020 DID NOT...
,

THE COVID STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TOLL FROM MARCH TO NOVEMBER 2020 DID NOT ONLY APPLY TO ACTIONS WHOSE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRED DURING THAT PERIOD; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S ACTION WAS TIMELY (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the COVID toll of the statute of limitations rendered plaintiff’s negligence action timely, noting that the toll did not apply only to statutes of limitations which expired during the toll period:

Pursuant to CPLR 214(5), an action to recover damages for personal injuries is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. In Brash v Richards, this Court held that the executive orders “constitute a toll” of the filing deadlines applicable to litigation in New York courts (Brash v Richards, 195 AD3d 582, 582 … ). … [T]his toll of the statute of limitations did not only apply to statutes of limitations that expired between March 20, 2020, and November 3, 2020 … .

… [D]ue to the tolling provision of the executive orders, the statute of limitations within which the plaintiff was required to commence this action was tolled between March 20, 2020, and November 3, 2020 …  Thus, this action … was commenced against those defendants well within the statute of limitations. Williams v Ideal Food Basket, LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 04436, Second Dept 8-30-23

Practice Point: The COVID toll of the statute of limitations from March to November 2020 applies to all actions, not only those whose statutes of limitations expired during that period of time.

Similar issue and result in Baker v 40 Wall St. Holdings Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 0179, Second Dept 4-3-24.

 

You might also like
JUDGE DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR THAT DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE INCLUDED A PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION, PLEA VACATED AND MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).
BANK’S EVIDENCE OF STANDING DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE (SECOND DEPT).
PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE LEAVES ON A STAIRWAY CONSTITUTED AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF NOTICE OF THE CONDITION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).
OFFICER DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE VAN AFTER HE LEARNED THAT DEFENDANT, WHO WAS SITTING IN THE PASSENGER SEAT, WAS SMOKING A CIGAR, NOT MARIJUANA, SUPREME COURT’S SUA SPONTE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST THE SEARCH WAS ERROR, THERE WAS UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE THE VAN WAS DEFENDANT’S WORK VEHICLE (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS IMPROPERLY ADDRESSED TO THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP, WHICH INCLUDED PEACE OFFICERS AS OPPOSED TO POLICE OFFICERS, THE WARRANT WAS PROPERLY ADDRESSED TO POLICE OFFICERS AS WELL; THE PARTICIPATION OF PEACE OFFICERS IN THE SEARCH WAS LIMITED AND DID NOT INVALIDATE THE SEARCH (SECOND DEPT).
Police Officer (a Passenger in a Police Car) Who Was Injured by Underinsured Driver Was Covered By Police-Officer-Driver’s (Private) Underinsured Motorist Endorsement
BANK MOVED FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE WITHIN ONE YEAR OF DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT).
Criteria for Abutting Property Owner’s Liability for Accumulated Snow and Ice on a Sidewalk (In the Absence of a Statute or Ordinance) Explained

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE PRE-ANSWER MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO A SUMMARY... A MUNICIPALITY HAS A DUTY TO INSPECT TREES ADJACENT TO ROADWAYS EVEN IF THE...