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LOANING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT A CAR WITH A BROKEN FUEL GAUGE WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S DEATH; THE CAR RAN OUT OF GAS AND PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT PULLED OVER ONTO THE SHOULDER OF A TWO-LANE ROAD; SHE WAS STRUCK BY A HIT AND RUN DRIVER WHILE PUTTING GAS IN THE CAR WITH A GAS CAN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the negligence ascribed to the defendant in this fatal traffic-accident case was not a proximate cause of the accident. Defendant allegedly loaned a car with a broken fuel gauge to plaintiff’s decedent. The car ran out of gas on a two-lane highway and plaintiff’s decedent pulled the car over onto the shoulder. When plaintiff’s decedent was attempting to put gas in the car with a gas can, she was struck and killed by a hit-and-run driver:

… [T]he plaintiff alleged that the defendant knew that his vehicle had a malfunctioning gas gauge but nonetheless “allowed the decedent . . . to borrow and use” the vehicle. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant negligently failed to maintain the vehicle in proper working order and loaned the vehicle to the decedent while it was in a state of disrepair, and that this negligence caused the decedent’s injuries. After the completion of discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, contending, inter alia, that it was not foreseeable that running out of gas would result in the decedent being struck by a hit-and-run driver, and that the defendant’s alleged conduct was not a proximate cause of the accident. …

… [T]he defendant established, prima facie, that his alleged negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. Even assuming, arguendo, that permitting the decedent to borrow a vehicle with a malfunctioning gas gauge “furnished the condition or occasion” for the accident … , under the circumstances here, a hit-and-run driver striking the decedent constituted an intervening act which was not foreseeable … . Biamonte v Biamonte, 2023 NY Slip Op 04296, Second Dept 8-16-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff’s decedent was struck and killed by a hit and run driver after the car loaned to her by defendant ran out of gas. The broken fuel gauge in the loaned car was not a proximate cause of her death. The hit and run accident was deemed an intervening act which was not foreseeable.

 

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