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PRECEDENT DID NOT REQUIRE THE TRIAL JUDGE TO ADMIT, UNDER SANDOVAL, EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION SIMILAR TO THE OFFENSE ON TRIAL; RATHER THAT PRECEDENT ONLY HELD EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED SOLELY BASED ON SIMILARITY; THE PREJUDICE VERSUS PROBATIVE-VALUE ANALYSIS SHOULD STILL BE APPLIED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the trial judge was not bound by Fourth Department precedent to admit, under Sandoval, evidence of a prior possession of a weapon conviction in this criminal possession of a weapon prosecution. The Fourth Department has held that evidence of a prior conviction should not be excluded solely based on similarity with the offense on trial. But here the Fourth Department made clear that the prejudice versus probative-value analysis should still be applied where the crimes are similar:

… [T]he court cited this Court’s decision in People v Stanley (155 AD3d 1684 [4th Dept 2017] …) and advised defense counsel that she “may want to discuss [her arguments] with the Fourth Department,” explaining that Stanley was “their ruling, not my ruling” and that it was “bound by [the Fourth Department’s] rulings.” …

Stanley, however, stands for the proposition that “[c]ross-examination of a defendant concerning a prior crime is not prohibited solely because of the similarity between that crime and the crime charged” … . That means that a Sandoval application by the People should not be automatically denied merely because a prior conviction is similar in nature to the present offense, and certainly does not mean that a court must automatically grant the People’s application. There was nothing in Stanley that “bound” the court in this case and, to the contrary, the court was required to make its own discretionary balancing of the probative value of defendant’s prior conviction against its potential for undue prejudice … . People v Colon, 2023 NY Slip Op 03583, Fourth Dept 6-30-23

Practice Point: Precedent holding that, under Sandoval, evidence of a prior conviction should not be excluded solely because it is similar to the crime on trial does not mean that similar crimes should automatically be admitted. The prejudice versus probative-value analysis should be still be applied to similar crimes.

 

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