You are here: / / ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT’S GRABBING AT HIS WAISTBAND AND RUNNING DID NOT...
,

ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT’S GRABBING AT HIS WAISTBAND AND RUNNING DID NOT PROVIDE REASONABLE SUSPICION, THE MAJORITY HELD DEFENDANT’S STOPPING HIS CAR IN THE STREET AND AGGRESSIVELY APPROACHING A WOMAN IN ANOTHER CAR PROVIDED REASONABLE SUSPICION; THE DISSENT DISAGREED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined the police had reasonable suspicion defendant was about to commit a crime when he grabbed at his waistband and ran. The police saw the defendant stop his car in the street and aggressively approach another car on foot. When the police told him to stop, he ran. The majority agreed with the dissent that defendant’s grabbing at his waistband did not provide reasonable suspicion he had a weapon. Rather the police saw enough to have reasonable suspicion the defendant was about to commit a crime when he aggressively approached the other car:

We agree with defendant that his arm movements directed at his waistband and his flight would not, without more, justify police pursuit. As the court determined, however, it was reasonable for the officers to suspect that defendant was about to commit a crime because he approached the woman in an aggressive manner with clenched fists while yelling at her. The officers thus properly ordered defendant to stop and could have lawfully frisked him had he not run away. Because the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, we conclude that the subsequent pursuit was also supported by reasonable suspicion, especially considering that, immediately following the stop, defendant turned his back to the officers, grabbed at his waistband, and then fled on foot, leaving his vehicle in the middle of the street with its driver’s door open.

From the dissent:

… [D[efendant’s digging at his waistband, flight, and leaving his car in the street “do not provide additional specific circumstances indicating that defendant was engaged in criminal activity” … . While defendant’s actions, “viewed as a whole, [may have been] suspicious, . . . there is nothing in this record to establish that the officers had a reasonable suspicion” that defendant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime … . People v Cleveland, 2023 NY Slip Op 03597, Fourth Dept 6-30-23

Practice Point: Both the majority and the dissent agreed that defendant’s grabbing at his waistband and running did not provide the police with reasonable suspicion. The majority found that defendant’s stopping his car in the street and aggressively approaching a woman in another car with clenched fists provided the police with reasonable suspicion and justified pursuit. The dissent disagreed.

 

You might also like
New York’s Seatbelt Defense Applies to Action Stemming from Pennsylvania Accident (Where There Is No Seatbelt Defense)—Defense Is Not a Conduct-Regulating Law (Which Would Trigger the Application of Pennsylvania Law)—Rather the Defense Relates to the Allocation of Damages (Which Supports the Application of New York Law)
Failure to Serve Claim by Certified Mail Deprived Court of Claims of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
ENGAGING IN COUNSELING SHOULD NOT BE A CONDITION OF VISITATION; THE COURT SHOULD NOT DELEGATE ITS AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE IF AND WHEN VISITATION SHOULD OCCUR TO A COUNSELOR (FOURTH DEPT). ​
A CRUCIAL DOCUMENT SUBMITTED TO PROVE THE AMOUNT OF A MEDICAID LIEN SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS A BUSINESS RECORD; THE DOCUMENT WAS NOT CERTIFIED BY AN EMPLOYEE FAMILIAR WITH THE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF THE ENTITY WHICH PROVIDED THE DATA COLLECTED IN THE DOCUMENT (FOURTH DEPT).
SENTENCING COURT MUST DIRECT THE MANNER IN WHICH RESTITUTION IS TO BE PAID, MATTER REMITTED, ISSUE SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL AND THE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR (FOURTH DEPT).
THE AMENDMENTS TO THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S DEFAMATION COMPLAINT (FOURTH DEPT). ​
Professional Reliability Exception to the Hearsay Rule (Re: Experts) Explained/Appropriate Date to Commence Prejudgment Interest in Breach of Contract Action Explained
LAW OFFICE FAILURE DEEMED AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR A DEFAULT IN RESPONDING TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PRECEDENT DID NOT REQUIRE THE TRIAL JUDGE TO ADMIT, UNDER SANDOVAL, EVIDENCE... THE PEOPLE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC...