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You are here: Home1 / Insurance Law2 / A PARTY INJURED IN A HIT AND RUN TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CANNOT SUE THE MOTOR...
Insurance Law, Negligence

A PARTY INJURED IN A HIT AND RUN TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CANNOT SUE THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION (MVAIC) IF THE PARTY WAS OPERATING AN UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT; HERE THE ELECTRIC BIKE PETITIONER WAS OPERATING WAS DEEMED AN UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner was not entitled to sue the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) for injuries suffered in a hit and run accident because the electric bike petitioner was operating was deemed to be an uninsured motor vehicle:

… [T]he petitioner testified, among other things, that the “electric bike” he was operating at the time of the accident was not equipped with pedals, was powered by an electric battery that must be charged in order for the vehicle to operate, and was “probably” capable of reaching a speed of approximately 30 miles per hour. …

A court may make an order permitting a person injured in a hit-and-run collision to commence an action against MVAIC to recover damages if the court is satisfied that, among other things, “the injured . . . person was not at the time of the accident operating an uninsured motor vehicle” (Insurance Law § 5218[b][3] …). “Uninsured motor vehicle” for purposes of the MVAIC Act is defined by reference to the definition of “motor vehicle” set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 (see Insurance Law § 5202[a], [c], [d]). “Motor vehicle” is defined by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 as “[e]very vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power,” with certain enumerated exceptions.

… MVAIC established as a matter of law that the electric-powered vehicle operated by the petitioner at the time of the accident was an uninsured motor vehicle … . Matter of Jackson v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 03464, Second Dept 6-28-23

Practice Point: A driver injured in a hit and run accident is not entitled to recover from the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation  (MVAIC) if the driver was operating an uninsured motor vehicle at the time of the accident. Here the electric bike the injured driver was operating was deemed an uninsured motor vehicle.

 

June 28, 2023
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-06-28 09:59:032023-06-30 10:36:19A PARTY INJURED IN A HIT AND RUN TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CANNOT SUE THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION (MVAIC) IF THE PARTY WAS OPERATING AN UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT; HERE THE ELECTRIC BIKE PETITIONER WAS OPERATING WAS DEEMED AN UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE (SECOND DEPT).
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