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PLAINTIFFS, PASSENGERS IN DEFENDANT’S CAR, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DESPITE DEFENDANT’S CLAIM THAT THE CAR AHEAD STOPPED SUDDENLY FOR NO REASON.

The Second Department determined defendant did not raise a question of fact in this rear-end collision case. Although defendant (Alvarez) claimed Cristea’s) car stopped suddenly for no apparent reason, defendant acknowledged Cristea’s car was stopped at the time of the collision and defendant did not see the car until the collision. Plaintiffs, who were passengers in defendant Alvarez’s car, entitled to summary judgment:

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A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision … . While a nonnegligent explanation for a rear-end collision may include evidence of a sudden stop of the lead vehicle, vehicle stops which are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions must be anticipated by the driver who follows, since he or she is under a duty to maintain a safe distance between his or her vehicle and the vehicle ahead … .

Here, Cristea established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that he was not at fault in the happening of the accident … . Cristea submitted the deposition testimony of the parties, which demonstrated that Cristea’s vehicle was stopped when it was struck in the rear by Alvarez’s vehicle. Although Alvarez testified that Cristea’s vehicle braked suddenly, he admitted that Cristea’s vehicle was stopped at the time of impact, and that he did not see Cristea’s vehicle until he hit it. Under these circumstances, Alvarez’s claim that Cristea’s vehicle braked suddenly did not raise a triable issue fact as to whether any negligence on the part of Cristea contributed to the accident … . Gonzalez v Alvarez, 2017 NY Slip Op 04819, 2nd Dept 6-14-1

 

NEGLIGENCE (REAR-END COLLISIONS, PLAINTIFFS, PASSENGERS IS DEFENDANT’S CAR, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DESPITE DEFENDANT’S CLAIM THAT THE CAR AHEAD STOPPED SUDDENLY FOR NO REASON)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (REAR-END COLLISIONS, PLAINTIFFS, PASSENGERS IS DEFENDANT’S CAR, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DESPITE DEFENDANT’S CLAIM THAT THE CAR AHEAD STOPPED SUDDENLY FOR NO REASON)/REAR-END COLLISIONS (PLAINTIFFS, PASSENGERS IS DEFENDANT’S CAR, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DESPITE DEFENDANT’S CLAIM THAT THE CAR AHEAD STOPPED SUDDENLY FOR NO REASON)

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