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THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT POLICE OFFICER ACTED WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS IN THIS EMERGENCY-VEHICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined there was a question of fact whether defendant police officer acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others in this emergency-vehicle traffic accident case. Defendant police officer was responding to a call concerning a burglar alarm and was driving without emergency lights at 70 mph on a sparsely populated rural two-lane road with a 55 mph speed-limit when plaintiff attempted a left turn and the collision occurred:

… [D]fendant submitted the deposition testimony of plaintiff, who testified that as plaintiff approached the intersection from the two-lane, hilly, wet road, he did not see any other vehicles when he activated his left turn signal. Plaintiff testified that he began his left turn and was already in the process thereof when he first noticed defendant’s vehicle approaching his vehicle. Contrary to the dissent’s position, plaintiff maintains that defendant failed to yield to plaintiff’s right-of-way and did not concede the issue. Plaintiff further testified that defendant’s vehicle was coming toward his vehicle at a “high rate of speed” and did not have on any headlights, siren or flashing lights. While there was evidence that defendant attempted to brake before colliding with plaintiff’s vehicle, there was undisputed evidence that defendant’s vehicle was traveling 70 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone just prior to the collision and that defendant was still traveling 47 miles per hour at the time of impact with plaintiff’s vehicle. Defendant submitted his own deposition testimony which established that at the time of the accident defendant was responding to a police dispatch call of a “possible burglar alarm.” Defendant further testified that he was not sure whether he was responding to an emergency situation and only knew at the time that he was responding to “an alarm” at an address. 

From the dissent:

… [T]he evidence submitted by defendant established that he was traveling no more than 70 miles per hour when responding to the emergency, and that the posted speed limit in the area is 55 miles per hour. Data retrieved from the “black box” in the police vehicle showed that defendant started slowing down five seconds before the collision, decreasing his speed to 47 miles per hour by the time of impact. It is well settled that speeding by a police officer while operating an emergency vehicle during an emergency operation “certainly cannot alone constitute a predicate for liability, since it is expressly privileged under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b) (3)” … and the record here reveals no other conduct allegedly engaged in by defendant that made it ” ‘highly probable that harm would follow’ ” … . Gernatt v Gregoire, 2023 NY Slip Op 03094, Fourth Dept 6-9-23

Practice Point: Even though plaintiff was convicted of failing to yield the right-of-way, the majority held there was a question of fact whether defendant police officer acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. The officer was driving 70 mph on a sparsely populated rural road with a 55 mph speed limit, without emergency lights, when plaintiff attempted a left turn. The two-justice dissent argued the officer’s speeding was not enough to raise a question of fact.

 

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