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DEFENDANT WAS IMPROPERLY SUBSTITUTED AS A JOHN DOE IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION AND BECAUSE HE WAS SUED AS AN HEIR TO THE MORTGAGEE, AND NOT AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MORTGAGEE’S ESTATE, THE ACTION WAS TIME BARRED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court in this foreclosure action, determined defendant was not properly substituted in the amended complaint for a John Doe in the original complaint and, because defendant was sued in his capacity as the heir of the decedent, and not as a representative of the decedent’s estate, the action was time-barred:

Plaintiff commenced this mortgage foreclosure action … against … the mortgagee, David B. Bailey (decedent), and certain “John Does” and “Jane Does” defined in the complaint as “the tenants, occupants, persons or corporations, if any, having or claiming an interest in or lien upon the premises, described in the complaint.” Plaintiff subsequently discovered that decedent had died in 2018 and made an ex parte application seeking … to substitute Arthur Bailey, in his capacity as heir to decedent’s estate (defendant), as a John Doe defendant and for leave to file an amended complaint. …

We agree with defendant that his motion should be granted insofar as it seeks dismissal of the amended complaint against him. Defendant correctly contends that he was improperly substituted as John Doe #1 pursuant to CPLR 1024. Inasmuch as the original complaint “fail[ed] to mention decedent’s death” and defendant is being sued in the amended complaint in his capacity as an heir to decedent’s estate, defendant does not fit within the categories of John and Jane Does set forth in the original complaint and thus cannot be substituted therefor … . Further, although here plaintiff also filed and served an amended complaint on defendant solely in his capacity as heir to decedent’s estate and not as a representative thereof (… see generally EPTL 3-3.6 [a], [b] …), … the relevant statute of limitations expired prior to the order granting plaintiff’s ex parte application for leave to file the amended complaint (see generally CPLR 213 [4]). Citibank, N.A. v Bailey, 2023 NY Slip Op 00777, Fourth Dept 2-10-23

Practice Point: If a defendant does not fit any of the “John Doe” categories described in the original complaint, he cannot be added as a John Doe in an amended complaint.

 

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