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FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE APPOINTED MOTHER GUARDIAN OF THE JUVENILE, DISPENSED WITH SERVICE ON FATHER, AND MADE FINDINGS TO ALLOW THE JUVENILE TO APPLY FOR SPECIAL JUVENILE IMMIGRATION STATUS (SJIS); ALL OF THE COMPLICATED, INTERTWINED STATUTORY LAW EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother should have been appointed guardian of the juvenile and the court should have made findings to allow the juvenile to apply for special immigration juvenile status (SIJS). Family Court should not have required a birth certificate to prove the juvenile’s age:

Family Court Act § 661(a) permits the Family Court to appoint a guardian for a youth between the ages of 18 and 21 in order to establish that the youth is “dependent on a juvenile court” (8 USC § 1101[a][27][J][i]) for purposes of an application for SIJS … . The provisions of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (hereinafter SCPA) apply to the extent they are applicable to guardianship of the person of a minor or infant and do not conflict with the provisions of the Family Court Act … . …

… [T]here is no express requirement to submit certified copies of birth certificates in a proceeding such as this pursuant to Family Court Act § 661(a) … . … [T]he Family Court is only required to ascertain the juvenile’s age, and there is no statutory requirement that a petitioner submit any particular evidence to establish the juvenile’s age (see id.; SCPA 1706[1]). Here, for purposes of this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act § 661(a), the record supports a finding that the child is under the age of 21 … . …

Family Court should have granted the guardianship petition and the mother’s motions to dispense with service on the father and for the issuance of an order making the requisite declaration and specific findings so as to enable the child to petition for SIJS. Matter of Joel A. A. R. (Eddy A. A. G.), 2023 NY Slip Op 02881, Second Dept 5-31-23

Practice Point: Here the complicated, intertwined statutory law controlling special juvenile immigration status (SJIS), as well as the related evidentiary requirements in Family Court,  are explained in some depth.

 

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