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THE ORDER SUSPENDING THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE DURING COVID APPLIED HERE; DEFENDANT’S SPEEDY-TRIAL MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined the Executive Order suspending Criminal Procedure Law 30.30 (speedy trial) during the COVID pandemic was applicable and defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of the speedy trial statute should not have been granted:

Executive Order 202.87, while it was in effect, constituted a toll of the time within which the People must be ready for trial for the period from the date a felony complaint was filed through the date of a defendant’s arraignment on the indictment, with no requirement that the People establish necessity in each particular case. We find that the phrase “to the extent necessary” modifies “suspended” and not “toll,” as it “explains how sections 303.30 and 190.80 are suspended—not in their entirety but ‘to the extent necessary'” … . Therefore, “Executive Order 202.87 does not require a showing of necessity to toll time periods because it does not explicitly condition the tolling on necessity” … . Moreover, as the People contend, CPL 30.30(4)(g) permits the exclusion of “periods of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances.” Finding that a showing of necessity is required for the exclusion of time under Executive Order 202.87 would render that Executive Order superfluous and unnecessary. People v Taback, 2023 NY Slip Op 02334, Second Dept 5-3-23

Practice Point: The People do not have to show “necessity” to take advantage of the order suspending the speedy trial statute during COVID.

 

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