You are here: / / YOUTHFUL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION PROPERLY USED TO DETERMINE SEX OFFENDER...

YOUTHFUL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION PROPERLY USED TO DETERMINE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) RISK LEVEL.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Leventhal, over a dissent, determined the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (Board) and Supreme Court properly considered defendant’s youthful offender adjudication in assessing defendant’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) risk level. The court distinguished People v Campbell, 98 AD3d 5, where it ruled a juvenile delinquency adjudication could not be considered in a SORA risk-level analysis. Here the youthful offender adjudication resulted in a level three risk-assessment. Without the youthful offender adjudication defendant would have been assessed a level-two risk:

 

[Re:] whether Campbell precluded the Board and the Supreme Court from considering the defendant’s youthful offender adjudication in determining his SORA risk level designation, we note that there are important distinctions between juvenile delinquency adjudications and youthful offender adjudications. While juvenile delinquency adjudications and youthful offender adjudications have somewhat analogous purposes, juvenile delinquency adjudications can only be made in Family Court Act article 3 proceedings, and are based on acts committed by individuals who are too young to be held criminally responsible for their conduct. In contrast, youthful offender adjudications can only follow a criminal conviction. Comparing the relevant sealing provisions of the Family Court Act and the Criminal Procedure Law, it is clear that while evidence from juvenile delinquency proceedings is inadmissible in judicial proceedings, with an exception permitted only for sentencing in a criminal action (see Family Ct Act § 381.2[1]), sealed youthful offender adjudications may be made available if there is specific statutory or judicial authorization to do so (see CPL 720.35[2]…). Thus, as the People correctly contend, the statutory restrictions on the use of juvenile delinquency records addressed by this Court in Campbell are significantly different from the statutory restrictions on the use of youthful offender adjudications. Taking these distinctions in the statutory sealing provisions into account, we conclude that Campbell does not preclude the Board or the courts from considering a defendant’s youthful offender adjudication in determining his SORA risk level designation. * * *

… [A]s amended in 2011, [CPL 168-1(1)] clearly provides that members of the Board are employees of DOCCS, and that all official records relating to a youthful offender adjudication are to be made available to DOCCS [Department of Corrections and Community Services] (see CPL 720.35(2). Where, as here, the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts must give effect to its plain meaning … .  People v Francis, 2016 NY Slip Op 00488, 2nd Dept 1-27-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (YOUTHFUL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION PROPERLY USED TO DETERMINE SORA RISK LEVEL)/YOUTHFUL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION (PROPERLY CONSIDERED IN SORA RISK-LEVEL ASSESSMENT)/SORA (YOUTHFUL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION PROPERLY CONSIDERED IN SORA RISK-LEVEL ASSESSMENT)

You might also like
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, PRE-MIRANDA QUESTIONING OF THE DEFENDANT ABOUT HIS EMPLOYMENT CONSTITUTED CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION; ALL OF DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS, PRE- AND POST-MIRANDA, MUST BE SUPPRESSED; JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS ADMITTED FOR A NONHEARSAY PURPOSE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED FOR THEIR TRUTH (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE CHILD SUPPORT INCOME FOR TWO CHILDREN IN COLLEGE WAS COUNTED AS PART OF THE HOUSEHOLD INCOME, THE TWO COLLEGE STUDENTS WERE PROPERLY NOT COUNTED FOR FOOD STAMP ELIGIBILITY, THE DENIAL OF FOOD STAMPS WAS PROPER (SECOND DEPT).
VAGUE, CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS WILL NOT SUPPORT A CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT). ​
Failure to Specifically Demonstrate When Area Where Fall Occurred Was Last Inspected or Cleaned Required Denial of Summary Judgment
DEFENDANT DRIVER WAVED TO PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A PEDESTRIAN, INDICATING SHE WAS ALLOWING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT TO CROSS THE STREET; ONE SECOND LATER PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER CAR; THE ACCIDENT WAS THE RESULT OF A SUPERSEDING, INTERVENING ACT AND DEFENDANT WAS NOT LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT).
Motion for a Change of Venue Made in the Wrong County–Statutory Procedure Explained
MOTHER’S IMMIGRATION STATUS DID NOT AFFECT HER STATUS AS A DOMICILIARY OF NEW YORK, HER GUARDIANSHIP PETITIONS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE THE FINDINGS NECESSARY TO ALLOW HER CHILDREN TO APPLY FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) (SECOND DEPT).
IN THIS PARKING-LOT-ICE SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE SNOW REMOVAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT LAUNCH AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM AND THE PROPERTY OWNERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION; THE DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

REQUESTS FOR RECORDS OF SURGICAL PROCEDURES PERFORMED ON NON-PARTIES AND RECORDS... FRAUD CAUSES OF ACTION DID NOT MEET PLEADING REQUIREMENTS.