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IN THIS PARKING-LOT-ICE SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE SNOW REMOVAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT LAUNCH AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM AND THE PROPERTY OWNERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION; THE DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant snow-removal company, Landscapes, and the defendant property owners, Nambar, were not entitled to summary judgment in this parking-lot-ice slip and fall case. Landscapes did not show it did not launch an instrument of harm by piling snow which melted and formed ice, and the Nambar defendants did not show they did not have constructive notice of the icy condition:

… [S]ince the plaintiff’s pleadings alleged that the Landscapes defendants, through their snow removal efforts, created the icy condition in the parking lot, thereby launching a force or instrument of harm that caused the plaintiff’s injuries, those defendants, in support of their motion for summary judgment, were required to establish, prima facie, that they did not create the alleged dangerous condition … . The Landscapes defendants failed to make such a showing, as they did not affirmatively establish that they did not create the icy condition by negligently piling snow in an elevated area in the parking lot, where it allegedly melted and created a stream of water that refroze … . …

… [T]he Namdar defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether they had constructive notice of the alleged ice condition. The deposition testimony of the Namdar defendants’ building engineer raised a triable issue of fact as to whether those defendants had notice of the condition that allegedly caused the ice to form, i.e., the stream of water flowing from the pile of snow in the elevated area of the parking lot … . In addition, the deposition testimony of [one of the Landscapes defendants] indicated that the building engineer had instructed him to pile snow in certain places, including the elevated area of the parking lot, thus raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the Namdar defendants were responsible for creating the alleged ice condition … . Tomala v Islandia Expressway Realty, LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 02347, Second Dept 5-3-23

Practice Point: Here in this slip and fall case the snow-removal contractor did not demonstrate it did not launch an instrument of harm by piling snow such that it melted and formed ice and the property owners did not demonstrate they did not have constructive notice of or did not participate in the creation of the dangerous condition. The defendants should not have been granted summary judgment.

 

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