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DEFENDANT COULD NOT SEEK INDEMNIFICATION FOR PLAINTIFF’S DAMAGES FROM THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT’S SPECIAL EMPLOYEE FOR WHOM WORKERS’ COMPENSATION WAS THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Count, determined the defendant, TIA, could not seek indemnification for plaintiff’s damages from third-party defendant, Freeman, because plaintiff was Freeman’s special employee for whom Workers’ Compensation is the exclusive remedy:

Supreme Court should have dismissed TIA’s common-law indemnification and contribution claims on the ground that plaintiff was Freeman’s special employee when his accident occurred and therefore, the claims are precluded by the Workers’ Compensation Law. “A worker may be deemed a special employee where he or she is ‘transferred for a limited time of whatever duration to the service of another'” … . “While the mere transfer does not compel the conclusion that a special employment relationship exists, a court is most likely to find that it does where the transferee ‘controls and directs the manner, details and ultimate result of the employee’s work'” … . Carey v Toy Indus. Assn. TM, Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 02280, First Dept 5-2-23

Practice Point: If plaintiff’s sole remedy against a party is Workers’ Compensation, a defendant cannot seek indemnification from that party. Here plaintiff was the third-party defendant’s special employee so defendant could not seek indemnification from the third-party defendant.

 

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