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THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE CONTRACT WITH DEFENDANT SUBCONTRACTOR WAS REASONABLE BECAUSE THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE COULD BE TRIGGERED BY A PARTY OVER WHICH DEFENDANT HAD NO CONTROL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Singh, reversing Supreme Court, determined the counterclaims by defendant subcontractor, Nastasi, in this breach of a construction contract action, should not have been dismissed. The central issue was whether the one-year contractual statute of limitations was enforceable. Because the statute could be triggered by the failure of the owner to pay the plaintiff general contractor, Turner, a circumstance over which the defendant subcontractor, Nastasi, had no control, there was a question of fact whether the one-year limitations period was reasonable:

The relevant question when deciding whether a limitations period is enforceable is whether and when the damages were objectively ascertainable … . A contractual limitations period is unenforceable without a concrete determination of damages accrual … .

Here, the provisions setting a one-year limitation period for claims arising out of the contracts between Turner and Nastasi are reasonable on their face. However, the contracts also provide that payments by the owner are conditions precedent to any sums owed by Turner to Nastasi. As observed in D&S Restoration, it was neither fair nor reasonable to impose such a condition precedent, which was not within Nastasi’s control, but had the capability of nullifying its claim (D&S Restoration, 160 AD3d at 926).

… [T]he intent of the owner should not govern the interplay of the two provisions. Such a holding will unreasonably permit a party to choose to stay silent on the issue of owner payment unless it suited them, and unilaterally set the accrual date for the claim. Turner Constr. Co. v Nastasi & Assoc., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 08024, First Dept 12-29-20

 

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CPLR 204(A) IN CONJUNCTION WITH RPAPL 1301(3) TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS... THE PROOF WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL AND SUMMARY...