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ALTHOUGH THE JUDGE CAN PROPERLY AWARD COUNSEL FEES TO PETITIONER BASED UPON RESPONDENT’S VIOLATION OF AN ORDER OF PROTECTION, A HEARING IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE FEE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that the judge properly exercised discretion in awarding counsel fees to petitioner based upon appellant’s (Gorish’s) violation of an order of protection. However, the amount of counsel fees should have been determined by a hearing:

Under Family Court Act § 846-a, the court “may order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s reasonable and necessary counsel fees in connection with the violation petition where the court finds that the violation of its order was willful.” “The award of counsel fees is committed to the discretion of the Family Court” … . “[T]he reasonable amount and nature of the claimed services must be established at an adversarial hearing” … . Here, while the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding counsel fees to the petitioner, the court erred in determining the amount of the counsel fees without a hearing. Matter of Sicina v Gorish, 2022 NY Slip Op 05535, Second Dept 10-5-22

Practice Point: The violation of an order of protection is a proper ground for awarding counsel fees to the petitioner, but the amount must be determined by a hearing.

 

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