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SUPREME COURT HAD THE POWER TO APPOINT THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR TO REPRESENT THE ESTATE IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; DEFENSE COUNSEL REPRESENTED THE INSURER, NOT THE DEFENDANT ESTATE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court should have granted plaintiff’s motion to appoint the Public Administrator to represent the defendant estate in this traffic accident case. Defense counsel represented the insurance company, not the estate:

… [C]ounsel’s affirmation stated that he “was retained by Truck Insurance Exchange to represent the interests of their insured Arthur Ketterer herein.” Under these circumstances, moving counsel lacked authority to represent the defendant estate … . …

In appropriate circumstances, the Supreme Court is empowered to appoint a temporary administrator, in order to “avoid delay and prejudice in a pending action” … . Such a determination is addressed to the broad discretion of the court … . Here, a Surrogate’s Court decree appointed the Public Administrator to represent the estate of Arthur C. Ketterer in a related prior action. That decree did not expressly grant to the Public Administrator the authority to represent the defendant estate in this action. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff’s cross-motion should have been granted, and we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for the appointment of a temporary administrator to represent the defendant in the instant action … . Franco v Estate of Arthur C. Ketterer, 2023 NY Slip Op 00988, Second Dept 2-22-23

Practice Point: Here in this traffic accident case, defense counsel represented the insurer, not the defendant estate. Therefore Supreme Court had the authority, upon plaintiff’s motion, to appoint the Public Administrator to represent the estate.

 

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