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QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT DEFENDANT’S KNOWLEDGE THE ICE AND SNOW WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL WAS A RECURRING CONDITION (CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE), AS WELL AS DEFENDANT’S ROLE IN CREATING THE CONDITION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact about defendant’s (Ryco’s) “constructive notice” and “creation” of the snow and ice condition in the are where plaintiff slipped and fell:

With respect to constructive notice, it is well settled that a “defendant who has actual knowledge of a recurring dangerous condition can be charged with constructive notice of each specific recurrence of the condition” … . Here, the Ryco defendants’ own submissions raise a triable issue of fact whether they had actual knowledge of a recurring dangerous condition in the parking lot in front of the entrance where plaintiff fell, thereby placing them on constructive notice … .

… [T]he Ryco defendants’ own submissions “failed to eliminate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the ice on which . . . plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell was formed when snow piles created by the [Ryco] defendant[s’] snow removal efforts melted and refroze” … . Britt v Northern Dev. II, LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 06486, Fourth Dept 11-19-21

 

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