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NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE LONG-ARM OR PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE ITALIAN MANUFACTURER OF A HOSE USED AS A COMPONENT IN A DISHWASHER MADE AND SOLD BY A NONPARTY (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined New York did not have long-arm or personal jurisdiction over an Italian company which manufactured a hose used as a component in a dishwasher made and sold by a nonparty:

… [T]he defendant was an Italian corporation with its business located in that country. It manufactured, sold, and distributed its goods in Italy, and had no office or agent in New York. The plaintiff failed to show that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York so as to subject it to long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) … . The plaintiff also failed to make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists under CPLR 302(a)(3).

Since the defendant was not subject to the jurisdiction of New York, the plaintiff’s service of process upon it was not valid (see CPLR 313 …). Economy Premier Assur. Co. v Miflex 2 S.p.A., 2023 NY Slip Op 00303,Second Dept 1-25-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff did not demonstrate the Italian company which manufactured a component of a dishwasher purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in New York. Therefore New York did not have long-arm or personal jurisdiction over the Italian company.

 

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