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THE AMENDMENTS TO THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S DEFAMATION COMPLAINT (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the amendments to the anti-SLAPP statutes (Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a, 76-a) do not apply retroactively and therefore should not have been the basis for dismissal of plaintiff’s defamation complaint:

… [T]the presumption against retroactivity is not overcome because “[n]othing in the text ‘expressly or by necessary implication’ requires retroactive application of the [anti-SLAPP] statute as amended . . . Nor does the legislative history support such an interpretation” … . First, the text of the legislation does not contain an express statement requiring retroactive application … . Second, while the anti-SLAPP amendments took effect “immediately” (id.), that term “is equivocal in an analysis of retroactivity” … . Third, although the legislation is remedial in nature and such legislation is generally applied retroactively “to better achieve its beneficial purpose” … , simply classifying a statute as remedial “does not automatically overcome the strong presumption of prospectivity” … . Finally, the legislative history establishes that the rationale for the amendments was to better advance the purposes of speech protection for which the anti-SLAPP law was initially enacted and to remedy the courts’ failure to use their discretionary powers to award costs and fees in such cases. However, the legislative history does not offer any explicit or implicit support for retroactive application … . Therefore, we conclude that “the presumption of prospective application of the [anti-SLAPP] amendments has not been defeated” … . Hoi Trinh v Nguyen, 2022 NY Slip Op 07387, Fourth Dept 12-23-22

Practice Point: The recent amendments to the anti-SLAPP statutes (Civil Rights Law 70-a, 76-a) do not apply retroactively.

 

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