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EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN PLAINTIFF BANK’S REPLY PAPERS PROPERLY CONSIDERED; THE BANK’S PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MORTGAGE AGREEMENT WAS INSUFFICIENT; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank’s reply papers were properly considered but plaintiff did not submit sufficient proof that a condition precedent in the mortgage agreement, re: notice of default, was complied with:

… [T]he Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in considering the affidavit of the plaintiff’s employee Jeremiah Herberg, which was submitted with the plaintiff’s papers in opposition to the defendant’s cross motion and in further support of its motion … . Although “‘[a] party moving for summary judgment generally cannot meet its prima facie burden by submitting evidence for the first time in reply . . . , there are exceptions to the general rule, including . . . when the other party is given an opportunity to respond to the reply papers'” … . Here, the defendant had the opportunity to address the Herberg affidavit in her reply papers in further support of her own cross motion.

However, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it complied with the condition precedent contained in section 22 of the mortgage agreement regarding the notice of default. The plaintiff’s submissions did not establish that the notice was sent by first class mail or actually delivered to the notice address, as required by the terms of the mortgage agreement … . Furthermore, Herberg’s affidavit failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of records concerning the plaintiff’s mailing of the notices of default (see CPLR 4518[a] …). Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v McKenzie, 2020 NY Slip Op 05086, Second Dept 9-23-20

 

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PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE IT TOOK ACTION... A PARTY’S ADMISSION IN AN UNCERTIFIED POLICE REPORT IS NO LONGER ADMISSIBLE...