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CIVIL SERVICE LAW SECTION 71 ALLOWS THE CITY TO TERMINATE AN EMPLOYEE WHO WAS INJURED ON THE JOB AND IS UNABLE TO RETURN TO WORK AFTER A YEAR; THE PROCEDURE FOR TERMINATING SUCH AN EMPLOYEE IS SUBJECT TO THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING REQUIREMENT OF THE TAYLOR LAW (CIVIL SERVICE LAW SECTION 200 ET SEQ) (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Troutman, reversing the Second Department, determined the city was required to engage in collective bargaining with the union to agree on the procedure for terminating an employee (here a firefighter) who was injured on the job and has not returned to work after a year:

Does the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law § 200 et seq.) require a municipality to engage in collective bargaining over the procedures for terminating municipal employees after they have been absent from work for more than a year due to an injury sustained in the line of duty? We hold that collective bargaining is required. * * *

“[W]here an employee has been separated from the service by reason of a disability resulting from occupational injury or disease as defined in the work[ers’] compensation law, [the employee] shall be entitled to a leave of absence for at least one year . . . ” (Civil Service Law § 71). * * *

Section 71 [grants] an employee with a work-related disability a leave of absence of up to one year and conditional reinstatement—even after that year has passed—while allowing the employer to fill the position if it chooses to terminate the employee.

… “[T]here is no ‘plain’ and ‘clear’ evidence that the Legislature intended” to foreclose from mandatory bargaining the procedures for terminating employees covered by the statute … . Both the language and legislative history of the section are silent on the issue of collective bargaining … . …

… [I]nasmuch as section 71 does not reference pretermination procedures at all, the statute plainly leaves room for the City and the Union to negotiate those procedures. Matter of City of Long Beach v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 2022 NY Slip Op 05939, CtApp 10-25-22

Practice Point: The procedure for terminating (pursuant to Civil Service Law 71) a firefighter who was injured on the job and was not able to return to work after a year is subject to the collective bargaining requirement of the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law Section 200 et seq).

 

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