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THERE WERE DISPUTED FACTS CONCERNING WHETHER DEFENDANT BREACHED THE COOPERATION AGREEMENT; THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTED FACTS; DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction by guilty plea, determined the judge should not have determined defendant breached the cooperation agreement without a hearing. The prosecutor argued defendant breached the agreement by not providing information which defendant didn’t reveal until he was about to testify against a codefendant in accordance with the agreement. The defendant argued the information did not relate to the codefendant and he did not believe it was relevant at the time the cooperation agreement was created:

“[S]entencing is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding and . . . ‘the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause'” … . Generally, “a guilty plea induced by an unfulfilled promise either must be vacated or the promise honored” … , but, where no promises are breached by the People and a defendant fails to abide by the terms of a cooperation agreement, a court is not obligated to permit a defendant to withdraw his plea … . Under the circumstances present here, these important issues have not been adequately resolved because the Supreme Court failed to hold a hearing or conduct a sufficient inquiry into whether the defendant violated the terms of the cooperation agreement … . …

This record reflects that the parties are sharply at odds as to whether there was a material breach of the cooperation agreement when the defendant provided additional information in response to new evidence shown to him during the codefendant’s trial … . The determination of this issue rests on nuanced considerations, including the defendant’s intent and the prosecutors’ interactions with the defendant while preparing for the codefendant’s trial. A hearing would have provided, among other things, an opportunity for the defendant to testify about the nature of the belatedly disclosed information, his reasons therefor, and his understanding of its importance to the case against the codefendant. People v Owensford, 2022 NY Slip Op 05716, Second Dept 10-12-22

Practice Point: Here there were nuanced disputed facts concerning whether defendant breached the cooperation agreement. The judge should have held a hearing to resolve the disputed facts. Conviction reversed and matter remitted.

 

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