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A DRAINAGE GRATE WHICH DOES NOT VIOLATE ANY CODE AND WHICH IS NOT DEFECTIVE IS NOT A DANGEROUS CONDITION SIMPLY BECAUSE IT WAS WET FROM RAIN AT THE TIME OF THE SLIP AND FALL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the drainage grate on which plaintiff slipped and fell was not a dangerous or defective condition. The grate did not violate any code and was not defective. The fact that the grate was wet from falling rain did not demonstrate a dangerous condition:

A property owner has a duty to maintain his or her premises in a reasonably safe condition … . “In order for a landowner to be liable in tort to a plaintiff who is injured as a result of a dangerous or defective condition upon the landowner’s property, the plaintiff must establish, among other things, that a dangerous or defective condition actually existed” … . Here, the defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating, prima facie, that the metal drainage grate, which was not in violation of any applicable code, was not in a defective or hazardous condition and that it maintained its premises in a reasonably safe condition … . The mere fact that the grate was wet from the falling rain was insufficient to establish the existence of a dangerous condition … . Shuttleworth v Saint Margaret’s R.C. Church in Middle Vil., 2022 NY Slip Op 05730, Second Dept 10-12-22

Practice Point: Here a drainage grate which did not violate any code and which was not defective was not a dangerous condition simply because it was wet with rain at the time of the slip and fall.

 

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