You are here: / / HERE THE OWNER AND GENERAL CONTRACTOR DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT EXERCISE...
,

HERE THE OWNER AND GENERAL CONTRACTOR DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER THE WORK PLAINTIFF WAS DOING WHEN INJURED; THEREFORE THE LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THEM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THE COURT NOTED THAT THE RIGHT TO GENERALLY SUPERVISE THE WORK OR TO STOP THE WORK FOR SAFETY VIOLATIONS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE “SUPERVISION AND CONTROL” OF THE WORK WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 200 OR COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, dismissing the Labor Law 200 and negligence causes of action against the owner and general contractor, noted that the right to generally supervise the work, to stop the work for a safety violation or to ensure compliance with safety regulations does not amount to the level of supervision and control of the work for liability under Labor Law 200. Plaintiff worked for a subcontractor and was injured while attempting to guide a heavy concrete object as it was lowered into a hole by a crane:

“The right to generally supervise the work, to stop the work if a safety violation is noted, or to ensure compliance with safety regulations does not amount to the supervision and control of the work necessary to impose liability on an owner or a general contractor pursuant to Labor Law § 200” … . Here, … defendants established … that the alleged incident arose from work performed over which they did not exercise supervision or control … . Kelly v RBSL Realty, LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 07291, Second Dept 12-24-25

Practice Point: In the context of the requirements for Labor Law 200 and common law negligence liability for construction accidents, the owner’s and/or general contractor’s right to generally supervise the work and/or to stop the work for safety violations does not amount to “supervision and control” of the work.​

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF HOMEOWNERS’ ACTION AGAINST THE INSURER FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD AND NEGLIGENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFF ACKNOWLEDGED THE HOME WAS VACANT WHEN THE POLICY WAS PURCHASED AND AT THE TIME OF THE FIRE AND THE POLICY EXCLUDED COVERAGE FOR VACANT PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT).
BURDENS OF PROOF FOR MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE EXPLAINED; CRITERIA FOR RAISING AN ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL EXPLAINED.
FATHER, WHO LIVED IN FLORIDA, BROUGHT THIS PARENTAL ACCESS PETITION; FATHER INDICATED HE COULD NOT AFFORD TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK; HE APPEARED SEVERAL TIMES VIRTUALLY; HE DID NOT APPEAR AT THE LAST COURT DATE, BUT HIS ATTORNEY WAS PRESENT; THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE PETITION AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) ACTION FELL FROM AN INVERTED BUCKET HE WAS STANDING ON TO REACH A POWER CABLE; DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED THERE WAS NO NEED FOR PLAINTIFF TO ELEVATE HIMSELF TO DO HIS JOB; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY (SECOND DEPT).
THE ASSAULT ON PLAINTIFF STUDENT BY ANOTHER STUDENT HAPPENED IN SO SHORT A TIME IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY SCHOOL PERSONNEL; THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER HOMEOWNER WAS LIABLE FOR A LATENT DEFECT IN AN OUTSIDE STEP UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR 2ND DEPT.
Criteria for Abutting Property Owner’s Liability for Accumulated Snow and Ice on a Sidewalk (In the Absence of a Statute or Ordinance) Explained
NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE FLORIDA CHILD SUPPORT ORDER, EVEN THOUGH FATHER’S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION HAD TERMINATED BY THE TERMS OF THE ORDER (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

A CERTIFICATE OF INURANCE NAMING A PARTY AS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED IS EVIDENCE... THE PEOPLE AGREED DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATIONS IN THE OMNIBUS MOTION WARRANTED...