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ALTHOUGH THE HOME-INSPECTION CONTRACT WAS NOT SIGNED, PLAINTIFF TESTIFIED SHE WAS AWARE OF THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT AND AGREED TO THEM; THEREFORE THE UNSIGNED CONTRACT WAS ENFORCEABLE AND PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTIFICATION PROVISION ENTITLED DEFENDANT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant home-inspection company was entitled to enforcement of a provision in an unsigned contract. The home inspection contract provided that defendant would not be liable if plaintiff failed to timely notify defendant of any alleged defects in the property. Defendant moved for summary judgment based on plaintiff’s failure to notify. The fact that the contract was not signed did not raise a question of fact because plaintiff testified she was aware of the terms of the contract and agreed to them:

“[A]n unsigned contract may be enforceable, provided there is objective evidence establishing that the parties intended to be bound” … . Here, the plaintiff testified at her deposition that she was “certain” that she looked at the contract “at the time of the inspections,” that she understood the contents of the contract, and that “after reading the agreement before the July 2016 inspection” she “accepted these terms” and paid ARPI its fee. This testimony is bolstered by the fact that the plaintiff signed an identical contract four months earlier for a home inspection performed by the defendants. Accordingly, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the July 2016 contract was valid and enforceable … . Cotich v Town of Newburgh, 2022 NY Slip Op 05075, Second Dept 8-31-22

Practice Point: Although the home inspection contract was not signed, plaintiff testified she was aware of the terms and agreed to them. The contract was therefore enforceable and plaintiff’s failure to comply with the notification provision entitled defendant to summary judgment.

 

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