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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S DOUBLE-PARKED TRUCK MERELY FURNISHED THE OCCASION FOR THE MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT OR WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT; PLAINTIFF FLIPPED OVER THE MOTORCYCLE BRAKING TO AVOID COLLIDING WITH THE TRUCK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff motorcyclist raised a question of fact whether defendant’s double-parked truck was a proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff alleged the motorcycle struck a defect in the road which cause the motorcycle to veer toward defendant’s truck. Plaintiff flipped over the motorcycle when he braked to avoid colliding with truck. The issue was whether the double-parked trucked merely furnished the occasion for the accident or whether the double-parked truck was a proximate cause of the accident (a difficult distinction which comes up occasionally in the appellate decisions):

In support of its motion, [defendant] Peapod submitted the transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony in which the plaintiff testified that his motorcycle struck a road defect, but that the defect did not cause him to immediately fall or apply the brakes. Instead, when the motorcycle encountered the defect, the motorcycle veered toward Peapod’s double-parked truck 40 yards ahead of him in the same lane of traffic. In order to avoid colliding with the truck, the plaintiff applied the front brakes of the motorcycle, which resulted in him flipping over the motorcycle. Given this evidence, it cannot be said that Peapod established as a matter of law that the truck merely furnished the occasion for the accident … . Rather, this testimony demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the presence of Peapod’s double-parked truck was a proximate cause of the accident … . Further, the evidence relied upon by Peapod in support of its motion failed to establish, prima facie, that its truck was not negligently parked or violating applicable traffic regulations … . Colletti v City of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 05019, Second Dept 8-24-22

Practice Point: Accident cases sometimes require making a difficult distinction between merely furnishing an occasion for an accident, which is not actionable, and a proximate cause of an accident. Supreme Court held the presence of defendant’s double-parked truck merely furnished the occasion for plaintiff’s motorcycle accident. The Second Department reversed finding a question of fact whether the presence of the truck was a proximate cause of the accident.

 

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