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You are here: Home1 / Family Law2 / APPELLANT, A COUSIN, WAS NOT THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF A PARENT AND...
Family Law

APPELLANT, A COUSIN, WAS NOT THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF A PARENT AND WAS NOT, THEREFORE, A PROPER RESPONDENT IN THIS SEXUAL ABUSE/NEGLECT ARTICLE 10 PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined appellant was not the functional equivalent of a parent and therefore was not a proper respondent in this Family Court Act Article 10 sexual abuse/neglect proceeding:

We disagree with the Family Court’s determination that the appellant was a person legally responsible for Sabrina and Zulena within the meaning of the Family Court Act. The appellant was a cousin of the subject children who resided with them for a period of time in their grandmother’s apartment along with the children’s mother and father. The record demonstrates that numerous other adults and children resided in the apartment during the relevant time period, including the children’s aunt, uncle, and grandmother. Although Sabrina, who was about 13 to 15 years old during the relevant time period, testified generally that there were times when the appellant would supervise her, the testimony of other witnesses, including that of her mother, contradicted this aspect of her account. In this regard, Sabrina’s mother testified that she never made the appellant responsible for the children, and that she did not leave them alone with him, as there were always other caretakers present. Sabrina’s mother testified that Sabrina’s older sister was responsible for the children’s care on the occasions when she was at work or otherwise away from the home. In addition, the evidence at the hearing demonstrated that the children’s grandmother and other adults were present in the apartment during the time when Sabrina’s mother was at work. Although there was evidence that the appellant sometimes contributed money to the grandmother’s household, and that he had, on occasion, performed general household chores for the benefit of the entire family, these circumstances were outweighed by evidence that the appellant did not exercise control over the children’s environment in a manner commensurate with that of a parent … . Matter of Zulena G. (Regilio K.), 2019 NY Slip Op 06392, Second Dept 8-28-19

 

August 28, 2019
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-08-28 12:43:172020-01-24 05:52:29APPELLANT, A COUSIN, WAS NOT THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF A PARENT AND WAS NOT, THEREFORE, A PROPER RESPONDENT IN THIS SEXUAL ABUSE/NEGLECT ARTICLE 10 PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).
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