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THE NONPARTY SUBPOENA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN QUASHED AND THE RELATED PROTECTIVE ORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ISSUED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the nonparty subpoena should not have been quashed and the related protective order should not have been issued. The nonparty, Bijari, listed for sale the real property where plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff sought information about the sale because the information could be relevant to whether the homeowner’s exemption to Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) applied:

CPLR 3101(a)(4), concerning disclosure from nonparties to an action, provides that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof, by: . . . any other person, upon notice stating the circumstances or reasons such disclosure is sought or required” … .. Under that statute, the party who served the subpoena has an initial minimal obligation to show that the nonparty was apprised of the circumstances or reasons that the disclosure is sought … . Once that is satisfied, it is then the burden of the person moving to quash a subpoena to establish either that the requested disclosure “is utterly irrelevant to the action or that the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious” … . …

For a protective order to be issued, the party seeking such an order must make a “factual showing of ‘unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice'” … . “‘Trial courts are vested with broad discretion to issue appropriate protective orders to limit discovery. . . . [T]his discretion is to be exercised with the competing interests of the parties and the truth-finding goal of the discovery process in mind'” … . Here, Bijari failed to make the requisite showing pursuant to CPLR 3103(a) to warrant the issuance of a protective order with regard to the subpoena…. . Nunez v Peikarian, 2022 NY Slip Op 04969, Second Dept 8-17-22

Practice Point: Here in this Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) action the plaintiff subpoenaed a nonparty who listed for sale the property where plaintiff was injured. The information plaintiff sought was relevant to whether the homeowner’s exemption to Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) applied. The subpoena should not have been quashed and the related protective order should not have been issued.

 

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