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ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD CAN APPEAL A CHANGE OF CUSTODY TO WHICH THE CHILD IS OPPOSED, THE CHILD IS AGGRIEVED FOR APPELLATE PURPOSES, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD A FULL CUSTODY HEARING WITHOUT FIRST ASSESSING THE ALLEGATIONS OF A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES, AN APPELLATE COURT CAN TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF PRIOR MODIFICATION PETITIONS, AND FAMILY COURT MUST GIVE DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE CHILD’S WISHES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Scheinkman, that mother’s petition for a change in custody should not have been granted. The opinion is too comprehensive to be fairly summarized here. Of particular interest is the Second Department’s conclusion that Family Court should have not have held a full custody hearing without first determining whether the allegations warranted it. The Second Department took judicial notice of two prior petitions for modification which were dismissed, the last petition being very close in time to the instant petition.  The opinion is well worth reading in its entirety. It addresses several substantive issues and distinguishes some 4th Department authority. The Second Department summarized the issues and holdings as follows:

This appeal raises several important issues pertinent to child custody determinations. We conclude that: (a) the attorney for the child has the authority to pursue an appeal on behalf of the child from an order determining the custody of the child; (b) the child is aggrieved, for appellate purposes, by an order determining custody; (c) the Family Court should not have held a full custody hearing without first determining whether the mother had alleged and established a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant an inquiry into whether the child’s best interests were served by the existing custodial arrangement; and (d) the Family Court erred in failing to give due consideration to the expressed preferences of the child, who is a teenager. Matter of Newton v McFarlane, 2019 NY Slip Op 04386, Second Dept 6-5-19

 

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