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IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ORDER SUBSTITUTING THE BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE FOR THE PLAINTIFF-DEBTOR, THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DENIED DEFENDANTS’ MOTION AND DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO SEEK RELIEF FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that, as a matter of comity, based upon an order in bankruptcy court, a New York court will substitute the bankruptcy trustee as a party in a suit involving the plaintiff/debtor. Here there was no such order and the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted:

“‘[T]he integrity of the bankruptcy system depends on full and honest disclosure by debtors of all of their assets'” … . “By failing to list causes of action on bankruptcy schedules of assets, the debtor represents that it has no such claims” … .

“[O]nce a bankruptcy proceeding is commenced, all legal or equitable interests of the debtor become part of the bankruptcy estate, including any causes of action (… see 11 USC § 541[a][1]). Accordingly, where a debtor has sought chapter 7 bankruptcy protection, “the causes of action formerly belonging to the debtor . . . [vest] in the trustee for the benefit of the estate . . . [and] [t]he debtor has no standing to pursue such causes of action” … .

In cases where a plaintiff-debtor has successfully petitioned the bankruptcy court to reopen the bankruptcy to include a pending action, this Court has invoked the doctrine of comity to permit substitution of the bankruptcy trustee as a plaintiff … . Here, however, the Supreme Court went further, directing [plaintiff] to seek such relief from the bankruptcy court and denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint … . …

Under these circumstances, the court should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint … . Nevertheless, the trustee, if he or she should chose to re-commence the case in his or her own name, will enjoy the protection offered by CPLR 205 … . Turner v Owens Funeral Home, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 07238, Second Dept 12-2-20

 

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