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DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THE ADDRESS IN THE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE WAS NOT HIS DWELLING PLACE; DEFENDANT TOOK AFFIRMATIVE STEPS TO MISLEAD THE PARTY ATTEMPTING TO SERVE HIM (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant should have been estopped from claiming the address in the affidavit of service was not his “dwelling plaice” because defendant misled the party attempting to serve him:

Estoppel, in this context, may preclude a defendant “from challenging the location and propriety of service of process if that defendant has engaged in affirmative conduct which misleads a party into serving process at an incorrect address” … . For example, “where a defendant willfully misrepresented his address or violated a statutory notification requirement … , or where he ‘engaged in conduct calculated to prevent the plaintiff from learning his actual place of residence’ … , he may be estopped from asserting the defense of defective service” … .

Here, the record established that the defendant engaged in “affirmative conduct which misl[ed] a party into serving process at an incorrect address” … . Hudson Val. Bank, N.A. v Eagle Trading, 2022 NY Slip Op 04956, Second Dept 8-17-22

Practice Point: A party who affirmatively takes steps to mislead the party attempting to serve him will be estopped from claiming the address in the the affidavit of service is not his dwelling place.

 

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