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THE 20-YEAR DURATION OF REGISTRATION AND VERIFICATION OF A LEVEL ONE SEX OFFENDER STARTS ANEW WHEN THE OFFENDER, ALREADY REGISTERED IN ANOTHER STATE, MOVES TO NEW YORK AND NOTIFIES THE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Brathwaite Nelson, in a matter of first impression, determined that the 20-year duration of registration and verification of a level one sex offender starts anew when a sex offender registered in another state moves to New York:

The defendant contends that the 20-year period set forth in Correction Law § 168-h(1) must be diminished by the period of time that he was registered as a sex offender in another state. We disagree and hold that the “initial date of registration” referred to in that statutory provision means the initial date of the offender’s registration with the Division of Criminal Justice Services pursuant to New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C; hereinafter SORA). People v Corr, 2022 NY Slip Op 04183, Second Dept 6-29-22

Practice Point: A level one sex offender who was registered in another state before moving to New York does not get credit for the duration of the out-of-state registration.

 

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