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SANCTIONS PROPERLY IMPOSED FOR BRINGING A FRIVOLOUS LAWSUIT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined sanctions for frivolous conduct were properly imposed. The action was precluded by collateral estoppel and should not have been brought:

“The court, in its discretion, may award to any party or attorney in any civil action or proceeding before the court, except where prohibited by law, costs in the form of reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney’s fees resulting from frivolous conduct” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[a]). Conduct is frivolous under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 if it is “completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law” or it is “undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c][1], [2] …).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a) to impose a sanction upon Miller and his attorney consisting of costs in the form of an attorney’s fee (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[a]). Under the circumstances of this case, the court properly determined that Miller and his attorney engaged in frivolous conduct in commencing this action, as it was completely without merit in law, and could not be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c]). Miller v Falco, 2019 NY Slip Op 01589, Second Dept 3-6-19

 

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