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AFTER THE TRIAL HAD BEGUN AND WITNESSES HAD TESTIFIED, THE JUDGE BECAME ILL AND SOUGHT A COVID TEST; AFTER THE NEGATIVE TEST-RESULT, THE JUDGE, SUA SPONTE, WITHOUT DEFENDANT’S CONSENT, DECLARED A MISTRIAL; THE JUDGE’S FAILURE TO CONSIDER A CONTINUANCE OR THE SUBSTITUTION OF ANOTHER JUDGE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION; THE DOUBLE-JEOPARDY PROHIBITION PRECLUDED RETRIAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department granted defendant’s petition for a writ of prohibition barring retrial on the ground of double jeopardy. A jury was selected and three witnesses had testified when the trial judge became ill and scheduled a COVID test (which came back negative). The judge ultimately, sua sponte, declared a mistrial without defendant’s consent. Because there were alternatives to a mistrial, a continuance, for example, the double-jeopardy prohibition precluded retrial:

… [T]here was no manifest necessity for the mistrial, and the court therefore abused its discretion in granting it sua sponte … . The record establishes that the court did not consider the alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance … or substitution of another judge … . “[I]f the judge acts so abruptly as to not permit consideration of the alternatives . . . or otherwise acts irrationally or irresponsibly . . . or solely for convenience of the court and jury . . . , retrial will be barred” … . “The court has the duty to consider alternatives to a mistrial and to obtain enough information so that it is clear that a mistrial is actually necessary” … . Matter of McNair v McNamara, 2022 NY Slip Op 03825, Fourth Dept 6-9-22

Practice Point: Here the judge became ill after the trial had begun and declared a mistrial without defendant’s consent and without considering a continuance or the substitution of another judge. There was no manifest necessity for the mistrial. The double-jeopardy prohibition therefore precluded retrial.

 

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