You are here: / / PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF SLIPPING ON THE BASKETBALL COURT WHICH WAS...

PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF SLIPPING ON THE BASKETBALL COURT WHICH WAS WET WITH CONDENSATION; PLAINTIFF WAS AWARE OF THE RECURRING CONDITION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendants were entitled to summary judgment in this basketball-injury case. Plaintiff was deemed to have assumed the risk of slipping and falling on condensation on the floor of the court:

… [T]he defendants established … ,that the plaintiff was aware of and had assumed the risk that the floor of the basketball court would be slippery from condensation that had formed due to humid conditions in the gymnasium. The defendants’ submissions, including the plaintiff’s own deposition testimony, demonstrated that the plaintiff had played basketball in the gymnasium on more than 50 occasions prior to the day of the accident, knew that the gymnasium air was “humid” and had dry-mopped the gymnasium floor while playing basketball in the past when it was “getting wet” from “[c]ondensation,” and nevertheless continued playing basketball in the gymnasium on multiple occasions up until the date of the accident despite his awareness of this condition. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury inherent in playing basketball on an indoor court which he knew to become slippery due to humid conditions in the gymnasium … . Lungen v Harbors Haverstraw Homeowners Assn., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 03717, Second Dept 6-8-22

Practice Point: Plaintiff was aware that the basketball court routinely became wet with condensation. Therefore he assumed the risk of slipping on the condensation while playing basketball.

 

You might also like
Losing Balance On Ladder Did Not Support Labor Law 240(1) Cause of Action
IT WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD TO RESTRICT CONTACT WITH THE INCARCERATED FATHER TO TELEPHONE CALLS (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SET ASIDE IN THIS SUBWAY SLIP AND FALL CASE AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, TRIAL EVIDENCE INDICATED COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ON PLAINTIFF’S PART (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE ABSENCE OF COMPARATIVE FAULT NO LONGER NEED BE SHOWN (SECOND DEPT).
PETITIONER MUST EXHAUST ITS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BY APPEALING THE DENIAL OF A BUILDING PERMIT BY THE TOWN BUILDING DEPARTMENT TO THE ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS BEFORE BRINGING A COURT ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT WAS HOUSED FIVE HOURS AWAY FROM THE COURT AND HIS ATTORNEY, REPEATED REQUESTS TO MOVE DEFENDANT CLOSER WERE GRANTED BUT NOT COMPLIED WITH, DEFENDANT MOVED TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA AT SENTENCING, GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY DEFENDANT HAD EFFECTIVELY BEEN DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, INQUIRY INTO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF OF THE PLEA SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE AMOUNT OF RESTITUTION IS PART OF THE SENTENCE AND MUST BE PRONOUNCED AT SENTENCING; THE ISSUE NEED NOT BE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL AND SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).
FAILURE TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS IN THE VILLAGE LAW REQUIRED INVALIDATION OF REFERENDUM PETITION.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304, PARTICULARLY THE MAILING... NO REASON MOTHER’S ATTORNEY COULD NOT BE PRESENT, EITHER IN PERSON OR...