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PLAINTIFF FELL DOWN AN OPEN, UNGUARDED MANHOLE AS HE ATTEMPTED TO STEP OVER IT; PLAINTIFF’S ACTION WAS NOT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PROTECTIVE RAILING AROUND THE MANHOLE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff fell into an unguarded, open manhole. Defendants argued plaintiff’s attempting to step over the manhole was the sole proximate cause of the fall. But the fact that the manhole was unguarded (another cause of the fall) defeated the sole proximate cause argument:

Plaintiff established prima facie his entitlement to summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim, it being undisputed that he was injured when he fell down an open and unguarded manhole that he had been attempting to cover, as instructed, while working on a construction site … . In opposition, defendants, the operator of the subway facility and its general contractor on the project, failed to raise an issue of fact. Their argument that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident because he allegedly stepped over the open manhole — at which point he was accidentally bumped by another individual and fell into it — is unavailing, given the lack of protective railing around the manhole or any other safety devices … . Piccone v Metropolitan Tr. Auth., 2022 NY Slip Op 03458, First Dept 5-26-22

Practice Point: A defense to a Labor Law 240(1) construction-accident cause of action is that the plaintiff’s own act or omission was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Here, even if plaintiff’s attempt to step over the open manhole was a proximate cause of his fall, the absence of a protective railing around the manhole was also a proximate cause. Plaintiff’s comparative negligence is not considered in a Labor Law 240(1) cause of action.

 

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