You are here: / / QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240...

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact (1) whether one defendant, the general contractor Russco, could be liable under Labor Law 240 (1) for plaintiff’s fall from a ladder based upon contractual safety responsibilities, and (2) whether another defendant, Ruggles, could be liable under Labor Law 240 (1) as a statutory agent of the owner exercising supervision and control over the work:

… [T]he contract … provides that Russco [the general contractor] is responsible for “taking all reasonable safety precautions to prevent injury or death to persons or damage to property” and that such responsibility extends “to the protection of all employees on the Project and all other persons who may be affected by the Work in any way” … . The project is defined in the contract as “construction of all Tenant Improvements for a retail store.” Reading these contractual provisions together creates ambiguity as to whether Russco’s site safety obligations extended to the signage and awning work that plaintiff was performing when his accident occurred. * * *

The Labor Law § 240(1) claim should not be dismissed as against Ruggles. “Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners, general contractors, and their agents to provide proper protection to persons working upon elevated structures” … . “To be treated as a statutory agent, the subcontractor must have been delegated the supervision and control either over the specific work area involved or the work which [gave] rise to the injury'” … . “[O]nce a subcontractor qualifies as a statutory agent, it may not escape liability by the simple expedient of delegating that work to another entity”  … .

Ruggles is a proper Labor Law § 240(1) defendant because it was a statutory agent of Express, the owner of the project. White v 31-01 Steinway, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 04279. First Dept 6-12-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT))/SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT))/STATUTORY AGENT (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT))

You might also like
Critieria for Amendement of a Notice of Claim Explained
USE OF A MAKESHIFT LADDER WHEN AN A-FRAME WAS AVAILABLE OR DESCENDING THE LADDER BACKWARDS WITH SHOES UNTIED DID NOT CONSTITUTE THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
One Year Statute of Limitations in Labor Law 740 Trumps the One-Year-Ninety-Days Statute of Limitations in General Municipal Law 50-e(5) (Incorporated Into the Health & Hospitals Corporation Act)
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER NEGLIGENT WAXING WAS CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S FALL.
Pointing Finger and Saying “I’m Going to Shoot You” Did Not Support Harassment and Menacing Charges
Court Must Consider Whether Both Parties, Not Only the Bank, Have Negotiated in Good Faith in the Mandatory Pre-Foreclosure Settlement Conferences (Re: Possible Modification of the Terms of a Mortgage Subject to Foreclosure)—Under the Totality of the Circumstances, Supreme Court’s Finding that the Bank Did Not Negotiate in Good Faith Was Not Supported
PLAINTIFF WAS HIT BY A FALLING CHISEL WHILE SITTING UNDER A SIDEWALK BRIDGE AT THE WORKSITE TAKING A BREAK; THE CHISEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SECURED AND THE SCAFFOLDING ABOVE PLAINTIFF WAS INADEQUATE TO PROTECT HIM FROM A FALLING OBJECT; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
A HEAVY STONE SLAB SLIPPED OUT OF A SLING AS IT WAS BEING HOISTED AND FELL ON PLAINTIFF; PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE TO SHOW THE EQUIPMENT WAS DEFECTIVE AND DID NOT HAVE TO SHOW HE AND A CO-WORKER WERE NOT NEGLIGENT; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DAMAGES AWARD IN A NEGLIGENCE SUIT BROUGHT BY A POLICE OFFICER RECEIVING ACCIDENTAL... PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION,...