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THE NEGLIGENT ROADWAY DESIGN CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED THE ABSENCE OF TURNOUTS FOR DISABLED VEHICLES CREATED A DANGEROUS CONDITION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the negligent roadway design cause of action against the city should not have been dismissed in this traffic accident case. Plaintiffs alleged the absence of turnouts for disabled vehicles on Harlem River Drive created a dangerous condition:

Defendants failed to establish that they were unaware of dangerous highway conditions on the northbound Harlem River Drive where the decedent’s accident occurred … , or that the previous accidents in that area of the Drive disclosed by the record were not of a similar nature to the decedent’s accident, or that the causes of those accidents were not similar to the alleged design-related cause(s) of the decedent’s accident … .

… [I]n or about 1983, “the City had received a study recommending that shoulders be added to this section of the Harlem River Drive, and even the City’s engineer admitted that the absence of a shoulder or other place of refuge created an unsafe traffic condition” … . … [T]he record in this case discloses that at least 11 more motor vehicle accidents occurred on the Harlem River Drive between 165th and 183rd Streets between October 1990 and September 1993 that were “related to disabled vehicles in the travel lanes that could be directly attributed to the Drive’s lack of shoulders.” The record also reveals that … the City has justified its inaction by minimizing the significance of pertinent accident data, suggesting that the safety benefit of adding shoulders or turnouts to the Harlem River Drive would be outweighed by the onerousness of the undertaking, and estimating a multimillion-dollar cost of the endeavor. A municipality breaches its “nondelegable duty to keep its roads reasonably safe . . . when [it] is made aware of a dangerous highway condition and does not take action to remedy it” … . Chowdhury v Phillips, 2022 NY Slip Op 03067, First Dept 5-10-22

Practice Point: Where, as here, the municipality (or the state) has undertaken studies which concluded a roadway design, here the absence of turnouts for disabled vehicles, created a dangerous condition, the city (or the state) will be liable for an accident caused by that dangerous condition.

 

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