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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER BOARDS OR MASONITE WERE SCATTERED DEBRIS OR DELIBERATELY PLACED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE RENOVATION WORK; PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION ON HIS LABOR 241(6) CAUSE OF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether boards/Masonite on the floor of a passageway were placed there as an integral part of the renovation project or were scattered debris constituting a tripping hazard in violation of the Industrial Code (12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(1) or (e)(2)). The court held there was a question of fact on that issue and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 241(6) cause of action should not have been granted. The court noted that its decision to the contrary in Singh v 1221 Holdings, LLC (127 AD3d 607 [1st Dept 2015]) should no longer be followed:

Plaintiff claims that the boards were a tripping hazard and a violation of Industrial Code § 23-1.7 (e)(1) because defendants failed to provide him with a passageway free of obstructions. Defendants argue, however, that there is no liability because the boards were Masonite, not scattered materials or debris, and because they were purposefully laid out upon the floor each day, this being “integral to” the renovation work being performed.

At the outset, these arguments require us to address whether the “integral-to-the work” defense raised by defendants, but rejected by Supreme Court, equally applies to Industrial Code § 23-1.7(e)(1), as well as § 23-1.7(e)(2). We hold that it does. * * *

[The facts] raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether the boards were a “protective covering [that] had been purposefully installed on the floor as an integral part of the renovation project” … . … [S]ummary judgment in favor of plaintiff was improper because it was based on the mistaken supposition that the “integral-to-work” defense means integral to plaintiff’s specific task. The defense applies to things and conditions that are an integral part of the construction, not just to the specific task a plaintiff may be performing at the time of the accident … . Krzyzanowski v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 00232, First Dept 1-14-20

 

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