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THE VENUE DESIGNATION IN THE NURSING HOME ADMISSION AGREEMENT, SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S WIFE, WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE BY THE NURSING HOME (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the nursing home admission agreement, signed by plaintiff’s decedent’s wife (Anderson), was not a sufficient basis for changing the venue of this action against the nursing home from plaintiff’s residence, Bronx County, to the venue designated in the admission agreement, Westchester County. The decision is comprehensive and addresses several substantive issues (agency, rights of non-signatories, for example) not summarized here:

Although the defendant submitted a copy of the admission agreement, it did not provide an affidavit from anyone who signed the agreement, who was present when it was signed, or who otherwise claimed to have personal knowledge of that agreement. The admission agreement was not signed by the plaintiff or the decedent, and it did not identify or include the names of the plaintiff or the decedent anywhere on that document. * * *

An admission agreement may be enforced against an individual where it was properly executed by that individual’s “designated representative” … . As relevant here, “[d]esignated representative shall mean the individual or individuals designated in accordance with [10 NYCRR 415.2(f)] to receive information and to assist and/or act in behalf of a particular resident to the extent permitted by State law” … . The subdivision lists three ways in which a designation may occur … .

As the plaintiff correctly contends, the defendant failed to establish that Anderson was properly designated in any of the three ways authorized by applicable law … . Sherrod v Mount Sinai St. Luke’s, 2022 NY Slip Op 02826, Second Dept 4-27-22

Practice Point: In this case, the venue designation in the nursing home admission agreement, signed by plaintiff’s decedent’s wife, could not be enforced by the nursing home.

 

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