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PLAINTIFF’S STATE AND CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL; THE IDENTICAL CLAIMS UNDER FEDERAL LAW WERE DISMISSED IN FEDERAL COURT ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff was collaterally estopped from asserting her NYC Human Rights Law causes of act after the dismissal of identical claims made under federal law in federal court. The First Department acknowledged the NYC Human Rights Law causes of action must be analyzed separately and independently from the federal and state human rights law causes of action, but held that collateral estoppel was proper under the facts:

In light of the particular express facts that the federal courts found were conclusively demonstrated by the record on the summary judgment motions before the district court; the nature of the allegations underlying plaintiff’s State and City Human Rights Law claims in this action and the manner in which plaintiff has litigated those claims; and the relevant collateral estoppel case law … , we conclude that, even affording the City Human Rights Law claims the liberal analysis to which they are entitled, plaintiff’s claims under both the State and City Human Rights Laws were properly dismissed under the doctrine of collateral estoppel … . …

In concluding that plaintiff failed to allege discriminatory intent, the motion court correctly held that collateral estoppel applied to facts identical to those necessarily found by the district court to be undisputed when it granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s federal employment discrimination claims ..  …

… [I]n dismissing the discrimination and hostile work environment claims against NYU, the motion court correctly relied on the district court’s finding that defendants Joseph Thometz and Eve Meltzer (the individual defendants) were not supervisors or managers, and thus that [defendant] NYU, as plaintiff’s employer, was not strictly liable for their conduct … . …

… [T]he federal courts found that NYU provided a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for plaintiff’s termination: plaintiff breached a protective order issued by the district court by sending unsolicited emails to a potential witness in the federal action. Moreover, the federal courts found that plaintiff failed to present evidence that NYU’s reason was pretextual. … . Russell v New York Univ., 2022 NY Slip Op 02765, First Dept 4-26-22

​Practice Point: Although NYC Human Rights Law violations must be analyzed separately and independently from federal and state law violations, here the dismissal of the federal claims in federal court required the dismissal of the state and city claims pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

 

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