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IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CASE, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE LADDER WAS UNSECURED AND SHIFTED; DEFENDANT ALLEGED PLAINTIFF TOLD HIS SUPERVISOR HE LOST HIS BALANCE AND JUMPED FROM THE LADDER, RAISING A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S ACTIONS WERE THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined conflicting facts precluded summary judgment in this Labor Law 240(1) ladder-fall case. Plaintiff alleged the ladder was unsecured and shifted when he attempted to descend. The defendant alleged plaintiff told his supervisor he lost his balance and jumped off the ladder which raised a question whether plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident:

… [T]he defendants raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the ladder shifted to the right and backwards, as the plaintiff testified, or whether the plaintiff’s own actions were the sole proximate cause of the subject accident. The defendants submitted an affidavit from the plaintiff’s supervisor, who averred that the plaintiff had told him, just after the accident occurred while he was still on the roof, that he had lost his balance as he descended the ladder and jumped off the ladder. The different versions of the accident given by the plaintiff create triable issues of fact that required denial of the motion, including a triable issue of fact as to the plaintiff’s credibility … . Jurski v City of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 02783, Second Dept 4-27-22

Practice Point: Evidence that plaintiff told his supervisor he lost his balance and jumped from the ladder created a triable issue of fact about whether plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident in this Labor Law 240(1) action.

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