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THE CITY FIREFIGHTERS WHO, AS ESSENTIAL EMPLOYEES, WERE REQUIRED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER TO WORK DURING THE PANDEMIC, SOUGHT TIME-OFF OR MONETARY COMPENSATION EQUIVALENT TO THE TIME-OFF AFFORDED THE NONESSENTIAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES WHO WERE SENT HOME DURING THE PANDEMIC PURSUANT TO THE SAME THE EXECUTIVE ORDER; THE THIRD DEPARTMENT DETERMINED ARBITRATION OF THE ISSUE WAS PRECLUDED BY PUBLIC POLICY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the city firefighters’ claim to entitlement to time off from work or monetary compensation equivalent to the time-off afforded the civilian employees ordered to stay home (due to COVID) was prohibited by public policy. The firefighters were deemed essential employees and were required to report to work by Executive Order. The “nonessential” civilian employees were ordered to stay home by the same Executive Order:

… [W]e cannot agree that petitioner breached the CBA [collective bargaining agreement] by responsibly implementing the Governor’s directives. To hold otherwise would create an untenable result — i.e., it would sanction a finding that petitioner breached the CBA based upon its required compliance with state public policy. Based on the very nature of the pandemic, requiring extreme public health measures as implemented through the executive orders, we conclude that arbitration of the resulting impact on respondent’s members is precluded as a matter of public policy. Matter of City of Troy (Troy Uniformed Firefighters Assn., Local 86 IAFF, AFL-CIO), 2022 NY Slip Op 02174, Third Dept 3-31-22

Practice Point: Here is a rare example of the preclusion of the arbitration of an employment issue by public policy. The firefighters were ordered to work during COVID as essential employees. The nonessential civilian employees were ordered to stay home. Public policy prohibited arbitration of the question whether the firefighters were entitled to equivalent time-off or monetary compensation.

 

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