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EACH TIME PLAINTIFF’S MARKETING DIRECTOR ENTERED A CONTRACT WITH A COMPANY IN WHICH THE DIRECTOR HAD AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST CONSTITUTED A SEPARATE WRONG UNDER THE CONTINUING WRONG DOCTRINE; THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FRAUD AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the continuing wrong doctrine applied to each time defendant hired Exit for video editing services within six years of filing the complaint. In addition, the complaint stated a cause of action for breach of a fiduciary duty:

This action arises from the conduct of plaintiff’s former director of marketing, Taufiq, in repeatedly contracting with Exit Editorial, Inc. (Exit), owned by Tristan Kneschke (together with Exit, the Exit defendants), for video editing services. Plaintiff claims that Taufiq falsely represented to it that he negotiated with Exit at arms length and that Exit’s prices were reasonable, when in fact its prices were well above market rate, he had an ownership interest in Exit, and he received a cash finder’s fee for each contract with Exit.

Plaintiff’s allegations and supporting affidavits were sufficient to permit an inference that a separate exercise of judgment, and thus a separate wrong, was committed each time Exit was hired, thereby enabling application of the continuing wrong doctrine … . * * *

The breach of fiduciary duty claim against Taufiq should be reinstated, as an agent has a duty to make full disclosure to its principal of any conflicts of interest and there is no requirement of justifiable reliance for such a claim … .Manipal Educ. Ams., LLC v Taufiq, 2022 NY Slip Op 02200, First Dept 3-31-22

Practice Point: An allegation that an employee entered contracts on behalf of his employer with a company of which the employee was a part-owner, without so informing his employer, supports causes of action for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Each contract constituted a separate wrong pursuant to the continuing wrong doctrine.

 

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