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In Responding to Defendant’s Criticisms of Defense Counsel’s Actions, Defense Counsel Merely Explained His Actions and Did Not Take a Position Adverse to His Client’s—Therefore the Defendant Was Not Entitled to Withdraw His Plea on the Ground that He Was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel

In affirming defendant’s conviction by guilty plea, the First Department determined that defense counsel, in responding to allegations about his performance made by the defendant, did not take a position adverse to his client’s. Rather, counsel merely explained the reasons for his actions and did not voice any opinion about the validity of defendant’s pro se motions. Therefore the defendant was not entitled to withdraw his plea on that ground:

“It is well settled that a defendant has a right to the effective assistance of counsel on his or her motion to withdraw a guilty plea” … . “When certain actions or inaction on the part of defense counsel is challenged on the motion, it may very well be necessary for defense counsel to address the matter when asked to by the court. When doing so, defense counsel should be afforded the opportunity to explain his performance with respect to the plea, but may not take a position on the motion that is adverse to the defendant. At that point, a conflict of interest arises, and the court must assign a new attorney to represent the defendant on the motion.” … . * * *

Counsel’s statement that defendant might not understand that he still retained certain residual rights to appeal despite the waiver, and that his concerns might be mitigated if the court explained that to him, was not adverse to defendant’s position. It merely conveyed that if defendant was informed that his waiver did not bar an appeal of all issues, including the voluntariness of the plea, it might affect his view of the waiver. Counsel’s factual statement that the waiver was a condition of the People’s plea offer, which reduced defendant’s sentence and made him eligible for parole at an earlier date, and that he did not believe that there was a basis for a CPL 30.30 motion because all but one of the adjournments since he had taken over the case had been on consent due to plea negotiations, did not go beyond a mere explanation of his performance … . Counsel did not deny that he advised defendant to agree to the waiver or that he refused to make a CPL 30.30 motion. Nor did he refute any specific factual allegation raised by defendant with respect thereto or affirmatively state his belief that defendant had no legal basis for withdrawing his plea. People v Maxwell, 2015 NY Slip Op 06199, 1st Dept 7-21-15

 

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