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DEFENDANTS’ PARTICIPATION IN A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE DID NOT WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO MOVE TO DISMISS THE FORECLOSURE ACTION AS ABANDONED PURSUANT TO CPLR 3215 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the foreclosure complaint should have been dismissed as abandoned because the plaintiff did not move for a default judgment within a year (CPLR 3215(c)). The fact that the defendants participated in a settlement conference did not waive their right to move to dismiss the complaint as abandoned:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to take steps to initiate proceedings for the entry of a default judgment against the defendants within one year after their default in the action, and has set forth no reasonable excuse for said failure … .

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the defendants did not waive their right to seek dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c). The defendants’ participation in a settlement conference did not result in a waiver of their right to seek dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) since they did not actively litigate the action before the Supreme Court or participate in the action on the merits … . Moreover, the defendants’ failure to move to vacate their default in answering the complaint or appearing in this action did not operate as a waiver of their right to seek dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) … . PennyMac Corp. v Weinberg, 2022 NY Slip Op 02010, Second Dept 3-23-22

Practice Point: Participation in a settlement conference does not waive a defendant’s right to move to dismiss a foreclosure action as abandoned based on plaintiff bank’s failure to move for a default judgment within a year.

 

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