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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Second Department determined defendant’s motion for change of venue should have been granted. The court noted that the sole residence of a domestic corporation for venue purposes is the county designated in its certificate of incorporation:

 

“[T]o prevail on a motion pursuant to CPLR 510(1) to change venue, a defendant must show that the plaintiff’s choice of venue is improper, and also that the defendant’s choice of venue is proper” … . The venue of an action is proper in the county in which any of the parties resided at the time of commencement (see CPLR 503[a]…). “[T]he sole residence of a domestic corporation for venue purposes is the county designated in its certificate of incorporation, despite its maintenance of an office or facility in another county” … . Matoszko v Kielmanowicz, 2016 NY Slip Op 00942, 2nd Dept 2-10-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CORPORATION LAW (RESIDENCE OF DOMESTIC CORPORATION FOR VENUE PURPOSES IS COUNTY DESIGNATED ON CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION)/VENUE (MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/VENUE (RESIDENCE OF DOMESTIC CORPORATION FOR VENUE PURPOSES IS COUNTY DESIGNATED ON CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION)

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