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THE JUDGE’S FAILURE TO PRONOUNCE THE DEFINITE TERM COMPONENT OF DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE REQUIRED VACATION OF THE SENTENCE AND REMITTAL FOR RESENTENCING; THE ISSUE SURVIVES A WAIVER OF APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant’s sentence and remitting for resentencing, determined the definite term component of the sentence was not pronounced by the court:

CPL 380.20 provides that a court “must pronounce sentence in every case where a conviction is entered.” That statutory requirement is “unyielding” … . A violation of CPL 380.20 “may be addressed on direct appeal notwithstanding [any] valid waiver of the right to appeal or the defendant’s failure to preserve the issue for appellate review” … . “When the sentencing court fails to orally pronounce a component of the sentence, the sentence must be vacated and the matter remitted for resentencing in compliance with the statutory scheme” … .

Here, although the certificate of conviction states that defendant was sentenced to a split sentence of a definite term of time served in jail and five years of probation, which is consistent with the sentencing promise made during the plea proceeding, the court failed to orally pronounce during the sentencing proceeding the definite term component of defendant’s sentence as required by CPL 380.20 … . People v Adams, 2022 NY Slip Op 01921, Fourth Dept 3-18-22

Practice Point: Every component of a sentence must be “pronounced” by the judge in open court or the sentence will be vacated.

 

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